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PREEMPTION

FEDERAL

Has the Federal Common-Law
I'Oeneh Doctrine
Been Preempted?
by Ralph C. Arnzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 202-206. © 2000 American Bar Association.

Ralph C. Anzivino is a professor
of law at Marquette University
Law School in Milwaukee, Wis.;
rcanzivino@aol.com
or 414-288-5365.

Editor's Note: The Respondent's
brief in this case was not available
by PREVIEWs deadline.

ISSUE
Did the enactment of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 displace
the federal common-law D'Oench
Doctrine?
FACTS
On Aug. 18, 1989, petitioner
Murphy invested more than
$500,000 in Orchid Island
Associates Limited Partnership
("Orchid") as part of a development
project for a golf and beach club in
Florida. Over a period of several
years extending before and after
this investment, Southeast Bank
lent Orchid approximately $50 million for the project. Throughout this
period, Southeast Bank exercised
extensive control and direction over
the project-making Southeast
Bank a de facto joint venturer with
Orchid. As a result of various
wrongful activities by Southeast
Bank and Orchid, Orchid eventually

defaulted on its loans, and
Southeast Bank foreclosed on the
property. In 1991, Southeast Bank
was declared insolvent and placed
into FDIC receivership.
In 1992, Murphy filed suit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia against the FDIC as
receiver for Southeast Bank. The
complaint alleged that Southeast
Bank's wrongful actions in concert
with Orchid caused the loss of
Murphy's investment. The complaint set forth claims for breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of contract,
accounting deficiencies, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and securities violations.
The FDIC-receiver moved to dismiss
the complaint, arguing that
Murphy's claims were barred by §
1823(e) of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA) and, independently, by the federal common-law
D'Oench doctrine. In particular, the
FDIC-receiver asserted that the
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D'Oench doctrine barred Murphy's
claims because liability depended
upon the joint misdeeds of
Southeast Bank and Orchid, but
there was no written agreement
memorializing their collusive wrongdoing as a formal "joint venture."
On Aug. 10, 1993, the district court,
treating the FDIC's motion as one
for summary judgment, granted
summary judgment on all counts.
The district court ruled that Murphy
couldn't recover against Southeast
on any theory of an alleged unwritten joint venture agreement pursuant to the D'Oench doctrine and
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e). Murphy
appealed.
On Aug. 1, 1995, the D.C. Circuit
reversed. The court held that §
1823(e) did not bar Murphy's claims
because those claims did not relate
to a specific "asset" acquired by the
FDIC, and that the Supreme Court's
decision in O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), removed
the federal common-law D'Oench
doctrine as a separate bar to such
claims. In O'Melveny, the Supreme
Court noted the extensive framework of FIRREA and commented
that to create additional "federal
common-law" exceptions would not
supplement this scheme but alter it.
The D.C. Circuit concluded that the
need for a body of federal common
law under the rubric of D'Oench has
now disappeared and that the district court erred in holding that
Murphy's claims are barred under
D'Oench.
On remand to the district court, the
FDIC-receiver again moved to dismiss petitioner's (amended) complaint on state-law grounds. On Aug.
21, 1996, the district court, without
ruling on the pending motion to dismiss, transferred the case, sua
sponte, over Murphy's objections, to
the Southern District of Florida.

On May 7, 1998, the FDIC-receiver
moved to substitute respondent
Jeffrey H. Beck, as successor agent
for Southeast Bank, as the party
defendant in the Southern District
of Florida. Beck had become the
successor agent of Southeast Bank
when, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 197,
the FDIC-receiver had completed its
receivership duties and called a
meeting of the shareholders of
Southeast Bank to elect an agent to
wind up the bank's affairs. After a
series of intervening appointments,
Beck, who was also the Chapter 7
trustee for Southeast Banking
Corporation and sole shareholder of
the bank, elected himself as the successor agent. On May 11, 1998,
respondent Beck, as successor agent
for Southeast Bank, was substituted
for the FDIC-receiver as the party
defendant.
On July 27, 1998, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of
Florida granted the motion to dismiss pending from the District of
Columbia court. The Florida district
court held, inter alia, that Murphy's
claims were barred by the commonlaw D'Oench doctrine, notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit's contrary
decision in the case. Murphy again
appealed.
On April 7, 2000, the Eleventh
Circuit, relying exclusively on the
common-law D'Oench doctrine,
affirmed the district court's decision. Murphy v. Beck, 208 F3d. 959
(11th Cir. 2000). The Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that the federal
common-law D'Oench doctrine was
still good law, notwithstanding
FIRREA and the Supreme Court's
decisions in O'Melveny and
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213
(1994). The Eleventh Circuit
explained that both O'Melveny and
Atherton dealt with the question of
whether to create new federal common law in particular areas rather

than with the question whether
Congress intended FIRREA to supplant the previously established and
long-standing federal common-law
D'Oench doctrine.
Murphy timely petitioned for a writ
of certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted on Sept. 26, 2000.
Murphy v. Beck, 121 S.Ct. 30
(2000). The Circuits are now evenly
divided on this issue. The D.C. and
Eighth Circuit have concluded that
the enactment of FIRREA has displaced the common-law D'Oench
doctrine, and the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits have concluded
that Congress intended no displacement of the doctrine. Compare
Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 1995), and Divall Insured
Income Fund Ltd. Partnershipv.
Boatmen's First National Bank, 69
F.3d 1398 (8th Cir. 1995) with
Young v. FDIC, 103 F3d 1180 (4th
Cir. 1997) and Murphy v. Beck, 208
F3d. 959 (11th Cir. 2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
The D'Oench doctrine originated
more than half a century ago in the
case of D'Oench, Duhme & Co. Inc.
v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). In
D'Oench, the FDIC sued to recover
on a note it had acquired in connection with payments it made for the
insurance fund to facilitate the
transfer of deposit liabilities from a
failed bank to a healthy bank. The
FDIC was acting in its corporate
capacity (FDIC-corporate) rather
than in its capacity as a
liquidating agent to liquidate a
failed financial institution (FDICreceiver). The maker of the note
defended on the ground that the
bank had agreed not to call the
note, although no such agreement
appeared in the bank's records.
Looking to a then-existing provision
of the Federal Reserve Act criminalizing the false overvaluation of a
(Continued on Page 204)
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security to influence any action by
FDIC-corporate, the Supreme Court
discerned a federal policy to protect
FDIC-corporate-and the public
funds that it administers-against
misrepresentations as to the securities or other assets in the portfolios
of the banks that the FDIC insures
or to which it makes loans. In light
of that policy, the Supreme Court
reasoned that one who gives a note
to a bank with a secret agreement
that it will not be enforced must be
presumed to know that it will conceal the truth from the vigilant eyes
of the bank examiners. It is sufficient if the maker lends himself to a
scheme or arrangement whereby
the banking authority on which
FDIC relied in insuring the bank
was, or was likely to be, misled.
Because the maker of the note in
D'Oench was responsible for the
creation of the false status of the
note in the hands of the bank, the
Court held that he was not allowed
to plead the "secret agreement."
Otherwise, he would have been able
to defeat the purpose of the statute
by taking advantage of an undisclosed and fraudulent arrangement
that the statute condemned and
which the maker of the note made
possible.
The original test stated by the
Supreme Court for determining
whether claims were barred under
the D'Oench doctrine was whether
the agreement, oral or written, was
either designed to deceive the public authority or would tend to have
that effect. Today, however, courts
have expanded the doctrine, and it
now applies in virtually all cases
where the FDIC is confronted with
an agreement not documented in
the institution's records.
The common-law D'Oench doctrine
serves two primary purposes. First,
it allows federal and state examiners
to rely on an institution's books and

records in evaluating the institution's fiscal soundness. Second, it
ensures a mature consideration of
unusual loan transactions by senior
bank officials and prevents the
fraudulent insertion of new terms
when a financial institution appears
headed for failure.
In 1950, Congress substantially
enacted the holding of D'Oench as
part of a provision relating to purchase and assumption transactions
by FDIC-corporate, but not when
the FDIC was acting in its capacity
as FDIC-receiver. See Federal
Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, c.
967, 64 Stat. 873, 889 (Sept. 21,
1950) codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1823(e). That provision originally
provided that "No agreement which
tends to diminish or defeat the
right, title or interest of the
Corporation [the FDIC] in any asset
acquired by it under this section,
either as security for a loan or by
purchase, shall be valid against the
Corporation unless such agreement"
satisfied four detailed conditions
relating to writing, execution,
approval, and recordation.
In 1989, as part of the comprehensive reforms adopted in the
Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (Aug. 9, 1989),
Congress amended 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) both to expand and to
make more precise the federal
defense against certain unwritten
agreements. FIRREA extended
§ 1823(e) to agreements tending to
diminish or defeat the interest of
the FDIC in any asset acquired by it
"as receiver" (FDIC-receiver), and
extended that section to the newly
formed Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(b)(4). FIRREA also added a
new provision at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(9)(A), which made

§ 1823(e) applicable to affirmative
claims against the banking
authority.
From 1950 to the present, the
Supreme Court has not considered
whether the D'Oench case has continuing force as a common-law rule
of decision separate from § 1823(e).
The lower federal courts, however,
have taken the holding of the
D'Oench case and expanded its
scope in a variety of directions. This
case presents the question whether
the expanded D'Oench "doctrine"
has any federal common-law existence independent of the terms of
§ 1823(e).
Murphy initially asserts that the
D'Oench doctrine cannot be applied
to cases where the FDIC is acting in
its capacity as receiver. Murphy
contends that there is a well-defined
dichotomy between the FDIC acting
in its corporate capacity when pursuing its own rights as a bank insurer (FDIC-corporate), and the FDIC
acting as a receiver of a failed bank
asserting derivative rights on behalf
of a bank's creditors and shareholders (FDIC-receiver). Murphy notes
that the common-law D'Oench
doctrine derived from a case in
which the FDIC was acting as FDICcorporate, not FDIC-receiver.
Therefore, Murphy posits that the
doctrine cannot be applied here,
where the FDIC is acting in its
capacity as FDIC-receiver.
Further, Murphy asserts that the
Supreme Court's decisions in both
O'Melveny and Atherton prohibit
the FDIC-receiver -from invoking
federal common law, which would
include the D'Oench doctrine.
Although neither case involved the
D'Oench doctrine, the Supreme
Court in both cases held that the
FDIC-receiver may not invoke federal common law to defeat claims
involving the rights of a bank in
receivership.

Issue No. 4

Murphy also argues that federal
common law can only be invoked
when a "federal interest" is
involved. Federal common law is a
disfavored creature limited to
exceptional circumstances demanding a federal rule of decision in the
absence of a federal statute to provide one. Federal common law
exists only in such narrow areas as
those concerned with the rights and
obligations of the United States,
interstate and international disputes
that implicate the conflicting rights
of states or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.
Murphy asserts that there is nothing
exceptional about claims against the
estate of a bank in receivership that
implicates a federal interest sufficient to draw the federal courts into
the task of lawmaking. Even when
the FDIC-receiver was still a party
to this case, there was no question
that it was acting only as a receiver
of a failed institution and was not
pursuing the interest of the federal
government as a bank insurer.
Further, as the case came to the
Southern District of Florida and the
Eleventh Circuit, even the FDICreceiver, having completed its
duties, left the scene, and pursuant
to 12 U.S.C. § 197, returned the
substantial remaining estate of
Southeast Bank to respondent as
the successor agent elected by and
acting for the benefit of the shareholders. While even the direct
involvement of the FDIC-receiver is
insufficient to support a federal
common-law rule, the current dispute affects only the shareholders of
the bank and petitioner Murphy and
does not even remotely implicate
significant federal interests. Neither
a need for uniformity, nor the
deposit insurance fund, nor the
proper operation of a federal program is in any way affected by the
competing private claims in this
case. Therefore, Murphy concludes,
in the absence of any federal inter-

est, the D'Oench doctrine cannot be
applied.
Finally, Murphy asserts that the
enactment of FIRREA displaced the
D'Oench doctrine. Murphy argues
that the detailed provisions of
FIRREA both confirm the absence
of federal common law, to begin
with, and negate any existing federal common law. FIRREA is quite
detailed regarding to whom and how
far its D'Oench-like protections
extend. For example, FIRREA
extended the previous statutory protections to the FDIC-receiver, the
RTC, and, at least for the FDIC, also
to certain affirmative claims. See 12
U.S.C. §§ 1823(e), 1441a(b)(4),
1821(n)(4)(1) and 1821 (d)(9). This
detailed legislative treatment of the
effectiveness of unwritten agreements suggests that Congress
extended protection to such parties
and such claims as it thought proper
and declined to go further. In other
words, allowing federal common law
to proceed where Congress has chosen to stop does not
supplement the scheme but rather
alters it.
The preemptive inferences from
FIRREA are further supported by
the Supreme Court's pre-FIRREA
decision in Langley v. FDIC, 484
U.S. 86 (1987). Interpreting the
word agreement in the 1950 version
of § 1823(e), the Supreme Court
looked to the D'Oench case, but
only as the leading case in the area
prior to enactment of § 1823(e) in
1950. D'Oench was used exclusively
as support for and confirmation of
the otherwise permissible meaning
of the word agreement, and there
was no suggestion that either
D'Oench or its progeny could
extend any protection beyond the
statutory terms. The Court viewed
the statute as the final word in the
area to the exclusion of federal common law.

Further corroboration that FIRREA
shut the door on any putative federal common law comes from the
behavior of the FDIC-receiver itself,
which suggests that in the wake of
FIRREA there is no need for the
D'Oench doctrine. As the FDICreceiver has argued in opposition to
petitions for certiorari, it has adopted a policy under which it claims it
will not invoke the common-law
D'Oench doctrine as to any transactions arising after FIRREA's enactment. See Noel v. FDIC, 120 S.Ct.
935 (2000), where the FDIC states
that it will assert D'Oench only as to
transactions preceding the Aug. 9,
1989, enactment of FIRREA.
Obviously, the FDIC has concluded
that the enactment of FIRREA has
displaced the common-law D'Oench
doctrine.
The enactment of a federal statute,
however, does not necessarily displace the federal common law. In
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529
(1993), the Supreme Court noted
the long-standing principle that
statutes that invade the common
law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of longestablished and familiar principles,
except when a statutory purpose to
the contrary is evident. The Court
held that in order to abrogate a
common-law principle, the statute
must "speak directly" to the question addressed by the common law.
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the most reasonable
reading of congressional intent was
that Congress did not intend
FIRREA to displace the D'Oench
doctrine but rather intended to continue the harmonious, 40-year coexistence of the statute and the
D'Oench doctrine. In other words,
the statute does not directly address
all the questions addressed by the
common-law D'Oench doctrine.

(Continued on Page 206)
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Finally, it can be argued that the
O'Melveny and Atherton cases do
not support Murphy's assertion that
the FDIC as receiver is unable to
invoke federal common law, including the D'Oench doctrine. Rather it
can be argued that O'Melveny and
Atherton dealt with the question
whether to create new federal common law, not whether Congress
intended the enactment of FIRREA
to supplant the federal common-law
D'Oench doctrine.

In 1989, Congress enacted the
Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act,
which incorporated some of the protections afforded by the D'Oench
doctrine. The question presented to
the Supreme Court is whether
Congress intended to displace the
common-law D'Oench doctrine
when it enacted FIRREA. Congress
was silent on the point, and the
Supreme Court must now decide.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
SIGNIFICANCE
The D'Oench doctrine is a valuable
tool in the FDIC's arsenal when
dealing with insolvent financial
institutions. The FDIC must swiftly
evaluate the assets and liabilities of
a failing financial institution in
order to decide whether to liquidate
or revive the failing entity. An
essential part of that process is that
the FDIC must be able to rely on
the books and records of the failing
entity without fear of extraneous or
secret agreements, which may not
appear in the records.

PARTIES
For Bruce Murphy (Erik S. Jaffee
(202) 237-8165)
For Jeffrey Beck (Elliot H. Scherker
(305) 579-0500)

For almost 60 years, the commonlaw D'Oench doctrine has protected
the FDIC by providing that no
claims or defenses can be asserted
against the FDIC, unless they are
evident from the books and records
of the failing institution. This permits the FDIC to be able to rely on
the institution's books and records
when deciding upon the most
appropriate course of action for the
failing entity.
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